When Brigadier General Andriy Biletsky of Ukraine's 3rd Army Corps stated on September 15, "In Vivaldi, as you know, there are four seasons," he was not giving a lecture on classical music. Instead, he was confirming, after months of an information blackout, a Ukrainian counteroffensive near Lyman, a rare return to combined-arms maneuver in a largely static war. [1]
Official sources put the total territory newly under Ukrainian control at 125 km², with one independent analyst citing more than 200 km². [2] Though modest in scale, Operation Vivaldi has reversed the gains made by Russia during its 2026 summer offensive around Lyman, relieving pressure on Ukraine's northeastern flank and showcasing the potential of unmanned systems in combined-arms warfare.
Donetsk Oblast has seen some of the war's heaviest fighting, as Russia seeks to capture Ukraine's "Fortress Belt" cities of Kostiantynivka, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka, and Sloviansk. Controlling these four cities offers a significant strategic advantage, as the territory to the west is sparsely populated and poorly defensible. As such, Ukraine has spent considerable resources fortifying them to serve as the backbone of its defense. [3]
According to Biletsky, Russia planned to encircle the Fortress Belt from the north and south, converging on Barvinkove in Kharkiv Oblast. For the northern pincer to succeed, it first had to seize the city of Lyman, where the Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps launched Operation Vivaldi in late May. [4]
Ukraine achieved operational surprise by utilizing a strict operational security (OPSEC) regime, imposing a near-total information blackout in the Lyman sector. Major Maksym Zhorin, the 3rd Army Corps' deputy commander, attributed this success in part to a new "Protective Drone" electronic warfare (EW) network, which he claimed neutralized around 20,000 Russian drones. [5]
In preparation for the counteroffensive, Ukraine extensively struck Russian logistics and drone operators at depths of up to 50 kilometers, later extending to 120 kilometers. Russian logistics, command and communication hubs, transportation, fuel supplies to occupied Luhansk, drone launch sites, and notably elite Russian Rubikon drone units were all targeted. The campaign of interdiction forced Russia to withdraw Rubikon and disperse supplies, while fuel shortages degraded Russian mechanized and EW capabilities. Russian front-line EW systems rely heavily on diesel generators, so disruptions in fuel supply impact Russia's EW capabilities. [6]
According to the Institute for the Study of War, Russia struggled to defend its forces from Ukraine's strike campaign because of air defense shortages. A widespread culture of lying about front-line positions, labeled by Russian milbloggers as "beautiful reports," likely hindered Russia's operational awareness of Ukraine's preparations and counteroffensive, delaying a proper response. [7]
The combination of these factors enabled a Ukrainian tactical drone overmatch and the element of surprise. New Ukrainian combined-arms tactics also contributed to the success in restoring limited maneuver; heavy bomber drones deployed explosive-laden unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) more than 10 kilometers behind Russian lines, followed by mobile infantry assault groups. [8]
The 3rd Army Corps reported these tactics brought a total of 125 km² under Ukrainian control, including taking the settlements of Shandryholove, Derylove, and Drobysheve, as well as inflicting more than 3,000 casualties. However, the casualty claims could not be independently verified. Russia has responded by shifting forces southward and concentrating on Mykolaivka. [9]
The first two seasons of Operation Vivaldi have been operationally significant in arresting the advance of the Russian northern pincer attempting to encircle the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk axis, forcing it back toward the Zherebets River. Prominent Russian milbloggers have acknowledged Ukrainian success in the Lyman direction. This broadly translates into a failure of the Russian 2026 summer offensive and relieves pressure on Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, though according to military analysts this is unlikely to signal a larger strategic shift in the war, given Russia's advantage in firepower and manpower. [10]
Operation Vivaldi's success casts doubt on the Russian military's ability to achieve its stated war goal of capturing all of Donetsk Oblast on the timeline projected by Moscow. Such failures are the likely cause of an intensifying information war, in which Russia exaggerates or actively fabricates the situation on the battlefield to present the conquest of the regions Moscow claims to have annexed as inevitable. [11] The new tactics employed by Ukraine, while successful in restoring limited maneuver to a largely static battlefield, may not yet be repeatable enough to enable large-scale Ukrainian maneuver. They have, however, demonstrated Ukraine's ability to conduct offensives at tactical depth and could prove significant to Ukraine's strategic planning with further refinement. Only two seasons have thus far been announced—the outcome in eastern Ukraine is still unwritten. [12]
Notes
- Kirichenko, "Ukraine Advances."
- Biletsky (@ab3army), Telegram post, September 20, 2026; Molin, "After 4 months of the Lyman counter-attack."
- Barros, "Importance of Ukraine's Fortress Belt."
- Ha, "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 17, 2026"; Eckel, "Quiet Ukrainian Counteroffensive."
- Ha, "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 17, 2026."
- Saunders, "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 19, 2026"; Ha, "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 17, 2026"; "Ukraine Reveals New Operation Vivaldi Gains."
- Sleiman, "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 15, 2026."
- Shcherbak, "Operation Vivaldi."
- Thomas, "Vivaldi Erased Russia's Lyman Pincer."
- Eckel, "Quiet Ukrainian Counteroffensive."
- Sleiman, "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 15, 2026."
- "Ukraine Reveals New Operation Vivaldi Gains."